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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The fitting analogy between a drafter of wills and a patent attorney,
and the hypothetical situations posed hereinabove, indicate that
decisions such as Garrison v. General Motors Corp. properly apply the
attorney-client privilege as readily to patent attorneys and their
clients as to any other attorney-client relationship. This complete
recognition of the attorney-client privilege in patent matters is not
an extension of the privilege as patent atorneys are attorneys-at-law
and thus qualify as proper subjects under any theory defining the
attorney-client privileged communications doctrine. The only con-
sideration which should be before a court in determining the appli-
cability of the attorney-client privilege in a certain situation should
be the requisities of the privilege 5 4 and not the label on the attorney
involved.
THE DEMISE OF FAIR TRADE IN PENNSYLVANIA:
A STUDY OF JUDICIAL DISENCHANTMENT*
INTRODUCTION
In a 5-2 decision handed down on March 26, 1964,1 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the nonsigner provi-
sion of the state's Fair Trade Act.2 Thus Pennsylvania joins the
54. 8 WIGMORE § 2292. Set forth in the text, supra at note 9.
* It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the history of Fair Trade
nor to define It. The reader is cited to a representative cross-section of material
both pro and con. Weston, Fair Trade, Alias "Quality Stabilization": Status,
Problems and Prospects, 22 A.B.A. ANTI-TRUST SECTION 76 (1963); Conant, Resale
Price Maintenance: Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 U. OF PA. L. REv.
539 (1961); Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes and Competitive Effects, 27
GEO. WASH. LAw REv. 621 (1958); Note, Fair Trade and The State Constitution,
10 VAND. L. REv. 415 (1957); Van Mell, The Case for Fair Trade, 44 ILL. BAR J.
40 (May 1955); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 175 (1954);
Schachtman, Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. OF PITT.
L. R. 562 (1950); Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and The Law of Restrictive
Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L. J. 607 (1940).
1. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores Inc., 414 Pa. 95,
199 A. 2d 266 (1964).
2. "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated In any contract entered into pursuant
to the provisions of section one of this act, whether the person so advertising,
offering for sale, or selling is, or is not, a party to such contract, is unfair com-
petition and in actionable at the suit of such vendor, buyer, or purchaser of such
commodity. .. ." 73 P.S. § 8
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ranks of those states repudiating fair trade.3 Because of previous
rulings to the contrary, 4 this decision may seem to be a dramatic
reversal. A closer study of the most recent decisions will, however,
reveal a thread weaving through the cases-a thread of judicial dis-
enchantment with the economic effects of fair trade.
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IMPOSED
The purpose of fair trade was early determined by the Court to be
a method of preventing predatory price cutting and cut-throat
competition. 5 However, even at this early stage the Court expressed
reservations about the scope of the Act.
While it is the purpose of the Fair Trade Act to prevent
cut-throat competition, it is not the purpose of the act to
prevent all business competition. Competition is still the
life of trade and no public policy is sound which stifles the
spirit of enterprise. 6
This observation expresses the purpose of limiting the Act's applica-
tion to situations which it was designed to prevent.
Constitutionality of the nonsigner provision 7 was first questioned
by the Court in Burche Co. v. General Electric Co. 8 The court gave
the issue relatively short-shrift. It stated that these acts are generally
considered valid (a statement that is not true today) 9 and that on
the strength of Old Dearborn D. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,' 0
the act was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
In Remington Arms Co. v. Gatling,1 1 a Federal District Court was
called upon to enforce the act. In granting the injunction, Chief
Judge Gourley observed:
It has always been my personal conviction that the enact-
ment of Fair Trade legislation among the different states
3. S pra note 1, Brief for the Appellants, Exhibit No. 1, points out that
up to the time of this case, 22 state courts have declared this type of legislation
violative of their respective constitutions and 7 states either did not pass or have
repealed the legislation.
4. Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A. 2d 361 (1955).
5. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Brothers Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843 (1939).
6. Id. at 89, 6 A. 2d at 847.
7. Under the nonsigner provision, once the manufacturer enters into an
agreement with any distributor or retailer fixing the retail price, then all re-
tailers are bound by the minimum price established.
8. Supra, note 4.
9. Supra, note 3.
10. 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
11. 128 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. of Pa. 1955).
19641
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
stifles competition and unduly impinges upon a free and
untrammeled economy.12
Here again is an indication of judicial concern questioning the
economic restraining force of Fair Trade.
In Benrus Watch Co. Inc., v. Frankel,13 the anufacturer's
fair trade agreement provided for a repurchase option period of
ten days after notice by the retailer of its desire to discontinue the
line of products. The Fair Trade Act expressly provided that a
retailer could close out his stock at any price he so desired.' 4 The
Court refused to enforce the repurchase option provision against a
nonsigner and commented:
... Plaintiff's authority or power to so bind defendants, to
an agreement which was not signed by them, is strictly
statutory and is in derogation of the common law. Plain-
tiff must therefore be bound by all of the provisions of the
statute upon which it relies for its power.'
Commenting of a 1956 amendment to the Pennsylvania Fair Trade
Act, ' 6 a Federal District Court asserted: '7
It has been consistently recognized by courts asked to
enforce fair trade laws . . . that the manufacturer is not
entitled to an injunction unless he has reasonably and dili-
gently enforced the fair trade prices specified by him.' 8
Here again was the theme of strict compliance with the Act's provi.
sions which the Court strictly construed inasmuch as the Act was in
derogation of the common law.
The Pennsylvania Act contained the usual requirement that a manu-
facturer must be in "fair and open competition" with manufacturers
12. Id. at 228.
13. 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 786 (1955).
14. "Such provisions in any contract shall be deemed to contain or imply
conditions that such commodities may be resold without reference to such agree-
ment in the following cases: (a) In closing out the owners stock for the purpose
of discontinuing delivering any such commodity. 73 P.S. § 7.
15. Bupra, note 13 at 789.
16. "It shall, however, be a complete defense to such an action for the
defendant to prove that the party stipulating such price, after at least seven
days written notice given by the defendant prior to the commencement of such
action, has failed to take reasonable and diligent steps to prevent the continuation
of such advertising, offering for sale, or selling, by those in competition with the
defendant, who were specified in such notice." 73 P.S. § 8.
17. General Electric Co. v. Hess Bros., Inc., 155 F. Supp 57 (E.D. of Pa.
1957).
18. Id. at 64.
[Vol. 2: p. 296
COMMENTS
of commodities of the same general class.' 9 In this area, the Courts
of the Commonwealth have severely limited the use of the Act by
demanding a high degree of proof of such "fair and open competition."
Thus, a manufacturer or producer selling its products competitively
on the same level as the retailer could not enforce a resale price main-
tenance agreement while itself selling below the minimum price
established.2 0 An admission by the defendant that the plaintiff
manufacturer was in fair and open competition was insufficient to
sustain plaintiff's burden. 2 1 Nor was a stipulation of fair and open
competition acceptable as sufficient proof by one seeking to enforce the
Act. 2 2 Where the evidence revealed a lack of free and open competi-
tion, the manufacturer was denied the rights he would otherwise have
had under the statute.2 3 The stringence with which this require-
ment was enforced prompted one court to dismiss a manufacturer's
action and comment:
Competition to be effective and thus free and open should be
competition to the extent that there is brought into play the
free economic forces of the open market so that they may
act upon the various manufacturers for the benefit of the
concuming public. There is nothing in the record as affects
the razor blade industry in the United States and in this
state particularly, to indicate that the commodities of the
three largest manufacturers have been subjected to the
economic pressures of the market place. 2 4
It should be obyious that economic considerations are cropping up
with more regularity and that the courts are basing their restrictive
comments on those factors.
THE POLITE INVITATION OF 1963 AND THE REQUEST FOR
REVERSAL OF 1964
In 1963 two cases were decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
which vividly point up a changing attitude-judicial disenchantment.
In Shuman v. Bernies' Drug Concessions, Inc.,25 Mr. Justice Cohen
19. Gillette Co. v. Masters, 408 Pa. 202, 182 A. 2d 734 (1962); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 443, 164 A. 2d 656 (1960).
20. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Blight Bros., 20 Pa. D. & C. 2d 794 (1959).
21. Gulf Oil v. Mays, supra, note 19.
22. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Breggar, 410 Pa. 408, 189 A. 2d 866 (1963).
23. Gillette Co. v. White Cross Discount Centers, 29 Pa. D. & C. 2d 756,
(1962).
24. Id. at 770.
25. 109 Pa. 539, 187 A. 2d 660 (1963).
19641
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
speaking for a unanimous Court invited a reappraisal of the Fair
Trade Act's constitutionality:
On a broader plain, counsel for appellee also draws into
question the ultimate constitutional validity of the non-
signer provision. In accordance with the familiar principle
that a court will not decide a constitutional question unless
it is absolutely required to do so, we refrain... However, we
cannot fail to observe increasing objection to the legality of
the non-signer provision in particular, and to the economic
soundness of fair trade laws in general. (Citing Authorities)
Changing patterns of merchandising and distribution require
a reappraisal of the underlying premise of fair trade legisla-
tion.26 (Emphasis Supplied.)
Following on the heels of Schuman in another 1963 indicator of
change wherein Mr. Justice Musmanno, speaking for the majority of
the Court, observed:
Price fixing is at its best a drastic curtailment of competi-
tive free enterprise, one of the main pillars of support in the
entire American economic structure. At its worst, it can be
a straight jacket on initiative in business...
The very idea that a commercial entity may hold . . . all
businessmen vending a certain product... offends against the
elementary concept of a free and independent society. The
Fair Trade Act is not only in derogation of the common law,
it is in defiance of principles which the Federal Government
has on countless occasions enunciated in its anti-trust legisla-
tion and litigation.2 8
Thus the Supreme Court, less than nine years after declaring the Act
constitutional, evidenced by its unsolicited dicta a discontent with the
economic effects of "Fair Trade" legislation.
An occasion for reappraisal of the constitutional question of the
nonsigner provision presented itself when Olin Mathison Chemical
Corporation sought to enjoin White Cross Incorporated, a discount
retailer of health and beauty aids, from selling below fair trade prices.
The nonsigner attacked the constitutionalty of the Act. The Chancel-
lor made findings of fact and law in favor of the manufacturer and
accordingly made permanent the injunction. The Chancellor in his
opinion examined the legislation in both its historical and present day
26. Id. at 545, 187 A. 2d at 664.
27. Supra, note 22.
28. Supra, note 22 at 413, 415, 189 A. 2d at 869.
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application. 29 While convinced of the economic unsoundness of Fair
Trade, the Chancellor considers himself in an unfortunate situation
bound by the 1955 decision in Burche. Constrained to follow precedent,
the Chancellor laments:
... although being in full accord with the defendants posi-
tion, I must with great reluctance decide in favor of the
plaintiff. I am so constrained because our Supreme Court
has held the Pennsylvania Act to be constitutional. Burche
Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A. 2d 316. (1955)
Although the act was not critically examined in that case, as
to this date, it is the law, and we are bound by it. However,
we cannot fail to note that recently our highest Court has
shown a positive inclination to reappraise the underlying
economic and legal principles supporting Fair Trade. (Citing
Cases) 30
Having found himself bound by precedent, Judge Weiss did, never-
theless, invite the defendants to take an appeal and expressed his
desire that his holding would be reversed.
I would certainly hope that the Defendants accept the
invitation by filing an appeal. Perhaps, when that reap-
praisal is made, this lengthy opinion will be affirmed, and
the decision rendered herein will be reversed.
In the opinion of Your Chancellor Fair Trade was born out
of a depression-and the high pressure lobbies were driving
a speat at the juglar vein of trade and sound economic
practices. We cannot see the wisdom of a State permitting
"price-fixing" as economically and logically sound 3... 1
With the two 1963 decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, the opinion of the Chancellor and the marked judicial dis-
enchantment with the economic feasibility of fair trade, the defend-
ant, White Cross appealed.
THE REAPPRAISAL IS MADE: THE AcT Is DEAD
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the nonsigner
provision of the Fair Trade Act violative of the State Constitu-
tion as an unlawful delegation of legislative power.3 2 The court's
29. Record for Appellants, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Vhite Cross
Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A. 2d 266 (1964).
30. Id. at 74a.
31. Id. at 75a.
32. Art. II, Sec. 1, was the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution which
was violated. It states that the Legislative power of the Commonwealth is in
the General Assembly.
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first task was to deal with the nine-year-old Burche case 3 3 which had
upheld the constitutionality of the nonsigner provision. Burche
relied on the famous Old Dearborn case in sustaining the constitu-
tionalty of the nonsigner provision under the State Constitution. As
the court pointed out, a study of Old Dearborn reveals that the case
stands for the proposition that the nonsigner provision is not violative
of the Federal Constitution,3 4 and therefore, it is not a basis for sus-
taining the validity of the provision under the State Constitution. The
court did not consider the argument that since the provision is valid
under the Federal Constitution, it could also be valid under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution for the same reason, to wit, the protection of the
manufacturer's trademark as a valid property interest. Quaere,
whether this reason would be sufficient to sustain the nonsigner pro-
vision's constitutionalty. However, is the absence of any consideration
of this argument in the Olin Mathieson case a further indication of the
court's distaste for the economic wisdom of Fair Trade?
With precedent removed, the court then considered price regulation
as a function of the legislature and any attempt to regulate prices
must be done in compliance with statutory guilelines. The mere giving
of the ability to fix prices to private individuals, binding upon all
persons in the state, without proper guides as to the price fixed, area
affected and products needing protection was deemed improper. The
court rejected the argument that the retailer, having notice of the
established price, is under no obligation to sell the article. It is sub-
mitted that this rejection was on the economic ground that a retailer,
in order to please and maintain his customers, must deal in certain
commodities and, therefore, is subjected to the control of the statute
even if he does not want to fair trade the merchandise.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Jones dissented in separate
opinions.
Mr. Justice Jones' dissent took the position that the Burche case
was properly decided and that the only reasons for reversal were
economic in nature3 5 and, therefore, were questions for the legisla-
ture.
33. Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., supra note 4.
34. Supra, note 10. This case dealt with the Illinois Fair Trade Act. The
Court considered the Act with respect to the Federal Constitution. It held that
the manufacturer had a valid property interest to protect in his trademark and,
therefore, a proper basis existed for the Act. The Court did not consider the Act
with respect to state constitutions.
35. This position was probably reached since both sides submitted economic
data for their respective positions. Economic Brief for the Appellants, and Brief
for Appellees, Appendix A, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores
Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A. 2d 266 (1964).
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The Chief Justice strongly dissented, not because he was in
sympathy with the Fair Trade Act, but on the ground that the pre-
vious decision, Burche, should be allowed to stand in deference to
stare decisis. He did not address the majority's position that the
Burche case was erroniously decided but stated that he felt the only
reason for reversal was a change in personnel of the court.
CONCLUSION
Thus, since the days of the enactment of Fair Trade, the judicial
branch of our government has limited the Act's application. The
frequency with which todays highest state courts are eliminating
the Act indicates a definite dislike of the economic effects of such
legislation. In Pennsylvania, since the Act was first declared con-
stitutional, the courts have continued to limit its use citing for their
reason the economic unsoundness of imposing restrictions on com-
petition. Whether the legislature will attempt to pass another version
of the Act remains to be seen. However, one cannot help but observe
the significance of the court's present statements, requiring govern-
mental agencies as the only proper method to regulate price, as a
warning not to attempt to give the manufacturer the unlimited power
to control the resale price.
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